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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON, ] 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
N.D. ,fPeteff HAYWARD, ] 
Salt Lake County Sheriff, ] 
Respondent-Respondent. ] 
) Case No. 20875 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIFW 
Appellant presents two issues for review by this 
Court: 
1. Should the State of Colorado be barred from 
extraditing the Appellant because of the failure of the 
Utah State Prison and the State of Colorado to comply with 
the provisions of the Disposition of Detainers Against 
Prisoners Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§77-29-1 & 2 (1953)? 
2. Should the Appellant be released on his Writ of 
Habeas Corpus because the conditions at the Salt Lake County 
jail deprive him of his right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment under the ^ ifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 20, 1985, the Appellant filed a Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging the legality of his 
confinement in the Salt Lake County Jail on a charge of 
being a fugitive from "justice from the State of Colorado. 
(R. p.2,3). The matter came on for evidentiary hearing on 
March 12, 1985 before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon. 
After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel for 
Appellant and Respondent, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
denied the Appellant's Petition. (R.o.&). The Appellant 
now appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah seeking 
a reversal of Judge Russon1s Order dismissing the Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (R.p.8,9). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Between November 16, 1982 and July 10, 1984, the Appellant 
was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. (R.P.22; Tr. of 
Writ of Habeas Corpus Hearing). During that period, the 
Appellant contends that there was an outstanding warrant out 
of the State of Colorado for the Appellant. (R. p.20, 
1. 20-25; R. p.22, 1. 6-21; Tr. of Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Hearing). However, the State of Colorado had not filed 
a detainer against the Appellant concerning the Colorado 
charges while the Appellant was at the Utah State Prison. 
(R. p.20, 1.25, p.21, 1. 1-8; Tr. of Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Hearing). Consequently, the Warden of the Utah State Prison 
did not inform the Appellant in writing of the outstanding 
charge from Colorado and of the Appellant's right to make 
a request for a final disposition under the Disposition of 
Detainers Against Prisoners Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 
et sea. (1953). Almost five (5) months after the Appellant 
was released from the Utah State Prison, he was arrested 
on a fugitive warrant originating out of the State of 
Colorado. (R. p. 2% 1. 15-20; Tr. of Writ of Habeas 
Corpus Hearing). On February 7, 1985, a governor's 
warrant was issued against the Appellant concerning the 
Colorado fugitive warrant. (P.. p. 22, 1. 25; P. 23, 1. 1-2; 
Tr. of Writ of Habeas Corpus Hearing; Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief, Exhibit A). 
At the time of the Habeas Corpus Hearing, the 
Appellant presented a statement alleging that the conditions 
at the Salt Lake County Jail are subiecting him to cruel and 
unusual punishment. (R. p. 26, 1. 5-23; Tr. of Habeas Corpus 
Hearing). No other evidence was taken by the District Court 
concerning the Appellant's claim of cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant contends that the failure of the State of 
Colorado and the Warden of the Utah State Prison to comply 
with the provisions of the Disposition of Detainers Against 
Prisoners Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§77-29-1 et seq. (1953) has 
substantially frustrated the Appellant's rehabilitation within 
the criminal justice system, and has therefore defeated the 
purposes and policies set forth in Article One of the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers, UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-5 (1953). 
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Consequently, the Appellant argues that fundamental 
fairness dictates that the State of Colorado should not 
be allowed to proceed with their charges against the Appellant. 
Further, the Appellant asserts that the conditions 
at the Salt Lake County Jail are resulting in a denial of 
the Appellant's constitutional right to be free from cruel 
and unusual punsihment, and therefore the Appellant should 
be released from the jail. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE FAILURE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO 
AND THE WARDEN OF THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
TO COMPLY WITH THE DISPOSITION OF 
DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS ACTS BARS 
THE COLORADO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. 
At the time of the filing of the Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus in this matter, the Appellant believed 
that the State of Colorado had filed a detainer against 
him while he was at the Utah State Prison. (R. p.20, 1, 20-25; 
Tr. of Writ of Habeas Corpus Hearing). Based upon the 
belief that a detainer was in place while he was in prison, 
the Appellant argued that the Warden of the Utah State Prison 
breached his duty to the Appellant by failing to inform him 
of the Colorado charge and of his right to make a request 
for a final disposition. The Appellant further argued that as 
a result of the Warden's failure to give him written notice 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 (1953), he was denied 
a 120 day disposition under UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 (1953). The 
Appellant then argues that the Colorado charge should 
now be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN, §77-29-1 (4) (1953) because the charge was 
not disposed of within 120 days because of the fault 
of the Warden at the Utah State Prison. 
Subsequently, counsel for Appellant ascertained 
that Colorado had not filed a detainer against the 
Appellant while he was at the Utah State Prison. (R. p. 
20, 1. 20-25; p-21, 1. 1-1; Tr. of Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Hearing). However, the Appellant still feels that 
equitable grounds exist for the dismissal of the Colorado 
charge, and the consequent release of the Appellant from 
the Salt Lake County jail on his Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
ARTICLE I of the Interstate agreement on detainers, 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-5 (1953) provides: 
The party states find that charges 
outstanding against a prisoner, detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations 
or complaints, and difficulties in securing 
speedy trial of persons already incarcerated 
in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties 
which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment 
and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the 
policy of the party states and the purpose of 
this agreement to encourage the expeditious 
and orderly disposition of such charges and 
determination of the proper status of any and 
all detainers based on untried indictments, 
informations or complaints. 
By failing to file a detainer against the Appellant 
while he was at the Utah State Prison, the State of 
Colorado has frustrated the policies stated above- At 
the time of his arrest, the Appellant was well on his 
way back to becoming a law-abiding, productive member 
of society. But because of the Colorado charge which 
is presently holding the Appellant in jail, his rehabilita-
tion has been interrupted. Because Colorado made a 
conscious decision not to file a detainer and to ignore 
the policies stated in the Disposition of Detainers Against 
Prisoners Act, it should not be allowed to come after the 
Appellant subsequent to his release from prison. 
In making the above arguments, counsel for Appellant 
is aware of recent Utah Supreme Court cases which set forth 
the controlling law concerning habeas corpus challenges 
after a governor's warrant has been issued, including the 
following cases: Phillips v. Vance, 594 P.2d 885 (Utah 1979); 
Langley v. Hayward, 656 P.2d 1020 (Utah 1982); and Emig v. 
Hayward, 14 Utah Advance Reports 8, Case No. 18823, filed 
July 15, 1985 (Utah). 
POINT II. THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE RELEASED 
FROM THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS THEREIN 
DENY HIM HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO BE FREE FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT. 
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At the hearing in this matter held on the date 
of March 12, 1985, the appellant was allowed to make 
a statement to the court regarding his incarceration 
in the Salt Lake County jail (R. p. 25-26; Tr. of 
Writ of Habeas Corpus Hearing). In the statement, the 
Appellant alleged that his confinement in the jail has 
resulted in the denial of his constitutional right to 
be free from cruel and unusual punishment. No other 
evidnece was taken by the District Court regarding the 
Appellant's allegations. The thrust of the Appellant's 
statement is that he should be released from the Salt Lake 
County jail because his confinement therein has resulted 
in the denial of his rights guaranteed under the Fifth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above arguments raised by the Appellant, 
it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the 
decision of the lower court denying the Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, thereby releasing the 
Appellant from custody in the Salt Lake County jail. The 
Appellant further requests the Court to order that the 
fugitive proceedings against him be dismissed with prejudice. 
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Respectfully submitted this
 iyc day of /y^C^^jf^^^^y 
1985. 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
^ K E Ri tJP^fi ft G A^ K**^  > 
Attorney foif—Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
>rtify that on the ,^C_day ofyC^2<^^^£^^^ I hereby cei 
1985, I hand delivered four (4) copies of the Appellant's 
Brief to the office of: 
T.L. "Ted" Cannon 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: Richard S. Shepherd 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
231 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM 
_ Q _ 
Exhibit A - Governor's Warrant 
(5n tJjE Bl]ZX\itBf Deputy Sheriffs and other officers of and in the several cities and counties of 
this State: 
SStfetcafi, / / has been represented to me by the Governor of the State of COLORADO 
that JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON 
stands charged with the crime of SEXUAL ASSAULT ON A CHILD, PATRONIZING PROSTITUTION OF 
CHILD, SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING, CRIMINAL
 whM hg certlfies {Q be a{meS 
ATTEMPT PATRONIZING PROSTITUTION OF A CHILD J 
under the laws of said State, committed in the County of DENVER 
in said State; and that he has fled from the justice of said State and has taken 
refuge in the State of Utah; and the said Governor of said State having, in pursuance of the 
Constitution and Laws of the United States, demanded of me that I shall cause the said 
JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON to be arrested 
and delivered to MOSE T R U J I L L O AND OR AUTHORIZED AGENTS who is duly 
authorized to receive H I M into hu custody and convey H I M back to the 
said State of COLORADO .
 and> 
SUjmafl, the said requisition is accompanied by a copy of the COMPLAINT/INFORMATION 
WARRANT; A F F I D A V I T ; AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS whereby the said 
charged with the said crime, certified by the said Governor as authentic. 
fflljmfnrE, You are required to arrest and secure the said JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON 
wherever HE may be found within this State, and afford HIM such opportunity 
to sue out a writ of habeas corpus as is prescribed by the laws of this State, and to thereafter 
deliver HIM into the custody of the said MOSE T R U J I L L O AND OR AUTHORIZED AGENTS 
to be taken back to the said State from which HE fled, pursuant to the said requisition, 
the said MOSE T R U J I L L O AND OR AUTHORIZED AGENTS paying all proper costs and 
fees for the arrest, detention and delivery of the said fugitive. 
(Stuen unilcr ttlQ ljan&, and the Great Seal of the State, in 
the City of Salt Lake, this S E V E N T H day of 
FEBRUARY in the year of our Lord 





THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, 
To All to Whom These Presents Shall Come—Sends Greeting-
NANCY DICK KNOW YE, That I,_ 
Act ing Governor of the State of Colorado, have authorized and empowered, and by these PRES-
ENTS do authorize and - r ^ M o s e T r u j i l l o and / o r agent . 
as Agent on the part of this State to receive from the proper authorities of the_ 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON 
fugitive from justice, and convey— m to this State to be dealt with 
according to law. All persons are therefore requested to permit the said Agent at his own 
proper cost, to remove the said! JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON 
and to transport h^m —.unmolested into this State, the said Agent 
peaceably and lawfully behaving. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Great Seal of the State to be affixed. 
Done at Denver, this 24_th _ d a y of 
January one thousand nine hundred 
and eJigbty-fiYfi 
By the GtowncK ACTING GgVERN/5R 
Secretary of State 
Exhibit B - Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, Judgment and Order 
T. L. "TED" CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: RICHARD S. SHEPHERD 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
N. D. "PETE" HAYWARD, 
Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C85-1298 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, judge of the above-entitled 
Court, on the 12th day of March, 1985, the petitioner appearing 
by and through Thomas J. McCormick, and respondent appearing by and 
through Richard S. Shepherd, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney? 
and the Court having received in evidence certified copies of 
thsoe documents relating to the extradition of Joseph Russell 
Norton, the originals of which are on file in the Leutenant 
Governor/Secretary of State's Office, and having heard arguments 
of counsel? and being fully advised in the premises, makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
C85-1298 
Page 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the petitioner, Joseph Russell Norton has been 
charged by complaint in the State of Colorado with the crime of 
Sexual Assault and petitioner's extradition for this crime has 
been sought by the Governor of the State of Colorado. 
2. That the petitioner has not placed in issue the 
following: (a) that petitioner is the person charged; (b) that 
petitioner was present in the State of Colorado when the crime 
charged was committed; or (c) that the charge constitutes a 
crime under the laws of the state of Colorado. 
3. That the documents presented to the Governor of the 
State of Utah by the Governor of the State of Colorado in support 
of extradition of the petitioner are on file with the Leutenant 
Governor/Secretary of State, and certified copies of the same 
were received by the Court in evidence. 
4. That the petitioner contended that he should not be 
returned to the State of Coloardo because (a) petitioner was not 
informed by the warden of the Utah State Prison that there was a 
charge pending; and (b) no detainer was lodged against the 
petitioner. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the documents on file with the Leutenant 
Governor/Secretary of State are legally sufficient under the 
laws of the State of Utah for the extradition of petitionee 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
C85-1298 
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Joseph RusseTl Norton, to Colorado as requested by the Governor 
of that state. 
2. That where a detainer was not lodged by the demand-
ing state of Colorado, there was no obligation to notify the 
petitioner of the outstanding charges. 
3. That the petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus should 
be denied and the petitioner returned to the State of Colorado, 
however a stay is granted to allow the petitioner to perfect his 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this
 V?/W~day of July, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
o 
'TIMOTHY R. HANSON, Judge 
LEONARD //• £(/±fO(U 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
this day of July, 1985, to Thomas J. McCormick, attorney 
for petitioner, by depositing same in the Legal Defender box 
located in the County Attorney's Office. 
T. L. "TED" CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: RICHARD S. SHEPHERD 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH RUSSELL NORTON 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
N. D. "PETE" HAYWARD, 
Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Respondent. 
The above-entitled matter having come on for hearing 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, one of the judges in the 
above-entitled Court, petitioner appearing by and through Thomas 
J. McCormick, petitioner's attorney, and respondent appearing by 
and through his attorney, Richard S. Shepherdr and the Court 
having.heard the evidence and argument, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being 
fully advised in the premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
petitioner's petition should be and is hereby dismissed, and 
petitioner is ordered returned to the custody of N. D. "Pete" 
Hayward, the Sheriff of Salt Lake County until such time as he 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. C85-1298 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Judgment and Order of Dismissal 
C85-1298 
Page 2 
may be expediently returned to the State of Colorado pursuant to 
legal process• 
DATED this 3//W^day of July, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON, Judge 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order of 
Dismissal this day of July, 1985, to Thomas J. McCormick, 
attorney for petitioner, by depositing same in the Legal Defender 
box located in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
Exhibit C - Disposition of Detainers Against Prisoners Act, 
UTAH CODE ANII. §§77-29-1 et seq.(1953) 
77-28a-3 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
contracts for the confinement of inmates in said institutions pursuant to 
Article III of that Compact. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-2, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, § 1. 
77-28a-3. Duties and powers of courts, departments, agencies and 
officers in enforcing and effecting compact. The courts, departments, 
agencies and officers of this state and its political subdivisions shall enforce 
this Compact and shall do all things necessary and appropriate to the 
effectuation of the purposes and intent of this Compact which may be 
within their respective jurisdictions including, but not limited to, the mak-
ing and submission of any reports required by that Compact. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-3, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, § 1. 
77-28a-4. State board of pardons — Authority to hold hearings. The 
board of pardons is hereby authorized and directed to hold such hearings 
as may be requested by any other party state pursuant to subparagraph 
(a) of Article IV of the Interstate Corrections Compact. The board is fur-
ther authorized to travel to any state which is a party to that Compact 
and to which an inmate is sent for confinement, for the purpose of holding 
any hearing to which that inmate is entitled by the laws of the State of 
Utah. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-4, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, § 1. 
77-28a-5. Governor — Power to enter into contracts. The governor 
is hereby empowered to enter into such contracts on behalf of this state 
as may be appropriate to implement its participation in the Interstate Cor-
rections Compact, pursuant to Article III thereof. No such contract shall 
be of any force or effect until approved by the board of examiners. 
History: C. 1953, 77-28a-5, enacted by L. 
1982, ch. 38, § 1. 
CHAPTER 29 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 
Section 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge — Duties of custodial officer 
— Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to 
trial. 
77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of untried indictments or informations. 
77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into law — Text of agreement. 
77-29-6. Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined. 
77-29-7. Interstate agreement — Duty of state agencies and political subdivisions to 
co-operate. 
186 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 77-29-1 
77-29-8. Interstate agreements _ Application of habitual criminal law. 
77-29-9. Interstate agreement — Escape of prisoner while in temporary custody 
77-29-10. Interstate agreement — Duty of warden. 
77-29-11. Interstate agreement — Attorney general as administrator and information agent. 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge — 
Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal 
of charge for failure to bring to trial. (1) Whenever a prisoner is serving 
a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or other penal or correc-
tional institution of this state, and there is pending against the prisoner 
in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall 
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appro-
priate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the 
charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of 
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial 
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be for-
warded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff 
or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so noti-
fied, provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of 
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown 
in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge.is not brought to trial within 120 days, or 
within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel 
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the 
court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter 
heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether 
a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order 
the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Criminal Law C=> 573-576. 
Cross-References. 22A CJS Criminal Law §§ 466-479. 
Right to speedy trial, Const. Art. I, §12; 21A AmJur 2d 303-342, Criminal Law 
77-1-6. §§ 849-875. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Commencement of ninety-day period. affect the commencement of the period. State 
Ninety-day period for prosecution under v Moore (1974) 521 P 2d 556. 
former 77-65-1 commenced on the day Motion to dism.ss charges against defend-
, , , . ..•r-j * i.*. r u - ant who was brought to trial 92 days after 
defendant notified county attorney of his
 w a r d e n r e c e i y e d ^ t i c e o f h i g ^ t for 
request for final disposition of case or cases
 f i n a l d i s p o s i t i on of pending charges was 
pending against him; and the filing of a com- properly denied since computation of time 
plaint, information or indictment did not period commenced from date that notice was 
187 
77-29-2 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
delivered to county attorney and appropriate 
court. State v Taylor (1975) 538 P 2d 310. 
Delays caused by prisoner. 
Where statute provided that prisoner be 
brought to trial within ninety days of his 
request for disposition of pending charges, 
the ninety-day disposition period was to be 
extended by the amount of time during 
which defendant himself created delay. State 
v. Velasquez (1982) 641 P 2d 115. 
Forfeiture. 
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have 
charges against him dismissed by remaining 
silent and failing to request an earlier set-
ting when trial court set date for trial 
beyond ninety-day period required under 
former 77-65-1; burden of complying with 
statute rested on prosecutor. State v. Wilson 
(1969) 22 U 2d 361, 453 P 2d 158, distin-
guished in 25 U 2d 117, 477 P 2d 147. 
Good cause for continuance. 
Where defendant's trial date was origi-
nally set for time within ninety-day period 
provided for under former 77-65-1 but, to 
accommodate defendant's counsel, was post-
poned until five days beyond the statutory 
period, the order fixing the trial date was 
within the authority of the court since good 
cause for a continuance had been shown. 
State v. Bonny (1970) 25 U 2d 117, 477 P 2d 
147. 
Trial court was within its discretion in 
granting continuance for trial on date 91 
days after defendant had submitted written 
request for disposition of pending criminal 
case where subpoenas had not been issued 
soon enough to proceed with trial on original 
date, despite defendant's counsel suggesting 
trial date within ninety-day period. Danks v. 
Turner (1972) 28 U 2d 277, 501 P 2d 631. 
Good cause for failure. 
Defendant, who was charged at a time he 
had other cases pending against him and in 
one of those cases requested and received 
psychiatric examination and who was 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
appointed various counsel because of neces-
sity and at his own request, was not denied 
right to speedy trial. State v. Carlsen (1970) 
25 U 2d 136, 478 P 2d 326. 
Premature request. 
Defendant's request for final disposition 
was premature where proceedings had 
advanced only to point of filing of complaint 
against him, since person accused of felony 
must plead to and be tried under information 
or indictment. State v. Belcher (1970) 25 U 2d 
37, 475 P 2d 60, distinguished in 30 U 2d 435, 
519 P 2d 244. 
Defendant, who was not finally tried 
within ninety days from date of request 
made pursuant to former 77-65-1, was not 
entitled to exoneration because his request 
was premature since only complaint for fel-
ony charge had been filed, good cause was 
shown for granting continuance, and insanity 
defense had precluded earlier trial. State v. 
Belcher (1970) 25 U 2d 37, 475 P 2d 60. 
Parolee who, after being arrested on com-
plaint, filed petition requesting final disposi-
tion of case within ninety days was denied 
relief under former 77-65-1 where trial was 
held more than ninety days after filing date 
of petition but within ninety days of filing of 
information. State v Clark (1972) 28 U 2d 
272, 501 P 2d 274, distinguished in 30 U 2d 
435, 519 P 2d 244. 
Former 77-65-1 did not apply to unfiled 
charges and defendant was not entitled to 
assert ninety-day limitation upon prosecu-
tion for any crime discovered or undiscovered 
which he might have committed. State v. 
Farnsworth (1974) 30 U 2d 435, 519 P 2d 244. 
Retention of request by warden. 
Any attempt by the warden to retain, 
beyond a reasonable time, a prisoner's 
request for final disposition of pending 
charges, his failure to complete the required 
certificate, or any attempt to misdirect the 
request and certificate, would violate 
prisoner's right to a speedy trial and provide 
a basis for judicial relief. State v. Taylor 
(1975) 538 P 2d 310. 
77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of untried 
indictments or informations. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall 
promptly inform a prisoner in writing of the source and contents of any 
untried indictments or informations against that prisoner concerning 
which he has knowledge and of that prisoner's right to make a request 
for final disposition thereof. 
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77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. The provi-
sions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged to be 
incompetent to proceed under chapter 15. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. Escape from custody by 
a prisoner after delivery of the written demand referred to in section 
77-29-1(1) shall void the request. 
History: C 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into law 
— Text of agreement. The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby 
enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions 
legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and 
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other 
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party 
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and 
orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status 
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or 
complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to 
such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, 
cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative procedures. It is the 
further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States 
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article HI hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availabil-
ity is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had 
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Arti-
cle IV hereof. 
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ARTICLE HI 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a 
penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the 
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other 
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis 
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be 
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered 
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting 
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and 
his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, informa-
tion or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request 
of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate 
official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment 
under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, 
the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state 
parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who 
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate 
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having 
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and con-
tents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his 
right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information 
or complaint on which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. 
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers 
and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the 
prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being 
initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, 
and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or 
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the 
original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint 
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shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition 
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included 
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to 
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after 
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request 
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the 
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required 
in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent 
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accord-
ance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph 
shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permit-
ted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of 
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall 
void the request. 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried 
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have 
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a 
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance 
with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for tempo-
rary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in 
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdic-
tion of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly 
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that 
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authori-
ties before the request be honored, within which period the governor of 
the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or 
availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in para-
graph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in cus-
tody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already 
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of 
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any 
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authori-
ties simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts 
in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with 
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for cus-
tody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
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(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall 
be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the pris-
oner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any 
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his deliv-
ery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be 
opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the send-
ing state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint con-
templated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original 
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, 
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and 
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, 
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver tempo-
rary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state 
where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such 
person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the 
request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary 
custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of 
this agreement. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority 
in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided 
by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the 
place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the 
custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of 
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint 
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of 
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been 
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or 
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the 
indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon 
shall cease to be of any force or effect. 
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(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only 
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges con-
tained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints 
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on 
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except 
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any 
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held 
in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting pros-
ecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner 
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, 
time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall 
be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and prac-
tice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state 
and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same 
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any 
other manner permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pur-
suant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory 
and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more 
untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which 
trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay 
all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned 
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a differ-
ent allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among them-
selves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any 
internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and 
in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdi-
visions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time peri-
ods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said 
time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is 
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of 
the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by 
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally 
ill. 
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ARTICLE VII 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, informa-
tion necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state 
when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agree-
ment may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. How-
ever, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any 
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time 
such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect 
thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its pur-
poses. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any 
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be 
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circum-
stance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circum-
stance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held con-
trary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall 
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force 
and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-5, enacted by L. state was interrupted for his return to the 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. sending state and is to be resumed, pursuant 
to detainer from the receiving state, after he 
Compliance standard. completes service of his sentence in the send-
The standard to which administration of ing state and an intervening federal sen-
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers tence. Hearn v. State (1982) 642 P 2d 757. 
should be held is substantial compliance with 
the terms of the agreement and fundamental Collateral References. 
fairness in the overall result. Hearn v. State Validity, construction, and application of 
(1982) 642 P 2d 757 Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 98 ALR 
. . . .
 J 3d 160. 
Sentence in receiving state interrupted 
for return to sending state. Law Reviews. 
There was substantial compliance with the Note, The State University's Place Among 
terms of this Agreement and no violation of Overlapping Police Jurisdictions During a 
fundamental fairness in the fact that Student Mass Disturbance, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 
prisoner's service of sentence in the receiving 474. 
77-29-6. Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" defined. The 
phrase "appropriate court" as used in the agreement on detainers shall, 
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with reference to the courts of this state, mean any court with criminal 
jurisdiction in the matter involved. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-6, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-7. Interstate agreement — Duty of state agencies and politi-
cal subdivisions to co-operate. All courts, departments, agencies, officers 
and employees of this state and its political subdivisions are hereby 
directed to enforce the agreement on detainers and to co-operate with one 
another and with other party states in enforcing the agreement and effec-
tuating its purpose. 
History: C 1953, 77-29-7, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-8. Interstate agreements — Application of habitual criminal 
law. Nothing in the agreement on detainers shall be construed to require 
the application of the habitual criminal law of this state to any person 
as a result of any conviction had in a proceeding brought to final disposi-
tion by reason of the use of said agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-8, enacted by L. Cross-References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Habitual criminals, 76-8-1001, 76-8-1002. 
77-29-9. Interstate agreement — Escape of prisoner while in tem-
porary custody. Escape or attempt to escape from custody, whether within 
or without this state, while in the temporary custody of an authority of 
another state acting pursuant to the agreement on detainers shall consti-
tute an offense against this state. Such escape or attempt to escape shall 
constitute an offense to the same extent and degree as an escape from the 
institution in which the prisoner was confined immediately prior to having 
been released to temporary custody, and shall be punishable in the same 
manner as an escape or attempt to escape from said institution. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-9, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-10. Interstate agreement — Duty of warden. It shall be lawful 
and mandatory upon the warden or other official in charge of a penal or 
correctional institution in this state to deliver any inmate thereof when-
ever so required by the operation of the agreement on detainers. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-10, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-11. Interstate agreement — Attorney general as administra-
tor and information agent. The attorney general is hereby designated as 
the officer who shall be the central administrator of and information agent 
for the agreement on detainers as provided in Article VII of the agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-11, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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77-30-2. Duty of governor to deliver person charged with crime upon demand by other state. 
77-30-3. Form of demand — What documents presented must show. 
77-30-4. Governor may investigate demand. 
77-30-5. Extradition for prosecution before conclusion of trial or term in other state — 
Return of person involuntarily leaving demanding state. 
77-30-6. Extradition for crime committed in another state by person while in this state. 
77-30-7. Governor's warrant of arrest — Recitals. 
77-30-8. Execution of warrant of arrest. 
77-30-9. Authority of officers under warrant of arrest. 
77-30-10. Time to apply for habeas corpus allowed. 
77-30-11. Penalty for disobedience of preceding section. 
77-30-12. Officers entitled to use local jails. 
77-30-13. Fugitives from justice — Warrant of arrest. 
77-30-14. Arrest without warrant. 
77-30-15. Commitment pending arrest under warrant of governor. 
77-30-16. Bail, except in capital cases. 
77-30-17. Procedure when no arrest made under warrant of governor. 
77-30-18. Forfeiture of bail. 
77-30-19. Procedure if prosecution pending in this state. 
77-30-20. Governor not to inquire into guilt or innocence. 
77-30-21. Governor's warrant of arrest recalled or another issued. 
77-30-22. Fugitives from this state — Issuance of governor's warrant. 
77-30-23. Fugitives from this state — Applications for requisition for return. 
77-30-24. Payment of expenses. 
77-30-25. Person brought into state on extradition exempt from civil process — Waiver of 
extradition proceedings — Non-waiver by this state. 
77-30-26. Prosecution not limited to crime specified in requisition. 
77-30-27. Uniformity of interpretation. 
77-30-28. Citation — Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. 
77-30-1. Definitions. Where appearing in this act, the term "governor" 
includes any person performing the functions of governor by authority of 
the law of this state. The term "executive authority," includes the governor 
and any person performing the functions of governor in a state other than 
this state. The term, "state" referring to a state other than this state, 
includes any other state or territory organized or unorganized, of the 
United States of America. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-1, enacted by L. 35 CJS Extradition § 3. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 31 AmJur 2d 921 et seq., Extradition § 1 et 
Cross-References. q* 
Duty of governor respecting extradition, Constitutionality, construction, and appli-
67-1-1(9) cation of statute authorizing extradition of 
one who commits an act within the state or a 
Collateral References. third state resulting in a crime in the 
Extradition <3=> 22. demanding state, 151 ALR 239. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Complaint. court of the county of Bonneville, state of 
In extradition proceedings under former Idaho," before the "probate judge," and certi-
statute, complaint made "in the probate fied by judge under seal of court, showed 
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venue sufficiently on its face. Bell v. Corless 
(1921) 57 U 604, 196 P 568. 
In extradition proceedings under former 
statute, complaint which stated all of essen-
tial facts constituting offense, and was sworn 
to in positive terms, was sufficient. Bell v. 
Corless (1921) 57 U 604,196 P 568. 
Effect of Act of Congress. 
The Act of Congress regarding fugitives 
from justice was in force in this state, and 
such fugitive could be arrested even before 
demand made, Ex parte Romanes (18—) 1 U 
23. 
Illegal means, effect 
The question of whether the state's power 
to t ry a person accused of a crime is 
impaired by the fact that he was brought 
within the territorial jurisdiction by illegal 
means was within the province of determina-
tion by state courts and presented no ques-
tion for review by the United States Supreme 
Court. Washington v. Renouf (1956) 5 U 2d 
185, 299 P 2d 620. 
Where there was a detention of an accused 
under legal process, his wrong against the 
state holding him was not to be condoned 
because of violence or wrong committed 
against his person by individuals who 
brought him into the jur isdict ion, even 
though such individuals might be subject to 
civil or criminal liability for their unlawful 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Collateral References. 
Extradition <§=> 24. 
35 CJS Extradition § 4. 
Appeal from order releasing one in extra-
dition proceedings, 5 ALR 1156. 
Bar of limitations as proper subject of 
investigation in extradition proceedings or in 
habeas corpus proceedings for release of one 
sought to be extradited, 77 ALR 902. 
acts. Washington v. Renouf (1956) 5 U 2d 185, 
299 P 2d 620 
Requisition. 
In extradition proceedings under former 
statute, authentication of papers attached or 
annexed to requisit ion was sufficient, 
although governor did not certify to genuine-
ness of annexed papers, where provisions of 
federal statutes were substantially complied 
with. Bell v. Corless (1921) 57 U 604, 196 P 
568. 
In habeas corpus proceedings by fugitive 
from another state, affidavits for requisition 
which contained positive and direct state-
ments of fact and charged in direct terms the 
commission of crime, were sufficient. Harris 
v. Burbidge (1921) 58 U 392, 199 P 663. 
Where one was accused of being fugitive 
from justice from state demanding his extra-
dition, it was held in habeas corpus proceed-
ing that court did not err in denying peti-
tioner right to introduce evidence tending to 
show that he was not fugitive from justice 
and that affidavits in support of requisition 
were false, since surrendering state had no 
legal right to take evidence or attempt to 
inquire into facts constituting crime by going 
behind positive s tatements of requisition 
affidavits nor to question sufficiency of such 
papers in any way when it appeared upon 
their face that they met requirements of 
statute. Harris v. Burbidge (1921) 58 U 392, 
199 P 663. 
Desertion or failure to support wife or 
child, one charged with as fugitive from jus-
tice and subject to extradition, 54 ALR 281. 
Determination in extradition proceedings, 
or on habeas corpus in such proceedings, 
whether a crime is charged, 81 ALR 552, 40 
ALR 2d 1151. 
Escaped or paroled convict, or one at lib-
erty on bail, extradition of, 78 ALR 419. 
Fugitive in custody, extradition of, under 
charge in asylum state, 42 ALR 585. 
Identification: necessity and sufficiency of 
identification of accused as person charged, 
to warrant extradition, 93 ALR 2d 912. 
Juveniles, extradition of, 73 ALR 3d 700. 
77-30-2. Duty of governor to deliver person charged with crime 
upon demand by other state. Subject to the provisions of this act, the 
provisions of the Constitution of the United States controlling, and any 
and all Acts of Congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of 
the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the execu-
tive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged 
in that state with treason, felony or other crime who has fled from justice 
and is found in this state. 
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Mission or motive of defendant in going to Sanity or insanity or pendency of lunacy 
asylum state as affecting right to extradite proceedings as matters for consideration in 
him, 13 ALR 415. extradition proceedings, 114 ALR 693. 
Motive or ulterior purpose of officials 
demanding or granting extradition as subject 
of inquiry, 94 ALR 1493. 
77-30-3, Form of demand — What documents presented must show. 
No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a crime in another 
state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing alleging, except 
in cases arising under section 77-30-6, that the accused was present in the 
demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and 
that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an 
indictment found or by information supported by affidavit in the state hav-
ing jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a 
magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued 
thereupon or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence com-
posed in execution, together with a statement by the executive authority 
of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confine-
ment or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole. The indict-
ment, information or affidavit made before the magistrate must 
substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime 
under the law of that state and the copy of the indictment, information, 
affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenticated by the 
executive authority making the demand. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Affidavit requirement. mingham v. Larson (1971) 26 U 2d 414, 490 P 
An affidavit is not required with the extra- 2d 893. 
dition papers when the charge is contained in Operation and effect. 
an indictment found by the grand jury. * 
Ludahl v. Larson (1978) 586 P 2d 439. W h ? r e a demand of the state of Oregon for 
extradition was written, alleged the presence 
Authentication.
 0f t n e plaintiff in the state of Oregon at the 
Authentication required was that of the time of the alleged crime and that he fled 
governor of the demanding state; require- from the state thereafter, and had attached a 
ment was satisfied by first sentence of number of documents which the governor 
request for extradition signed by the certified to be authentic and true, the 
demanding state's governor declaring that demand for extradition complied with the 
the annexed papers had been authenticated requirements of former section. Little v. 
in accordance with laws of that state. Bir- Beckstead (1961) 11 U 2d 270, 358 P 2d 93. 
77-30-4. Governor may investigate demand. When a demand shall be 
made upon the governor of this state by the executive authority of another 
state for the surrender of a person so charged with a crime, the governor 
may call upon the attorney general or any prosecuting officer in this state 
to investigate or assist in investigating the demand, and to report to him 
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the situation and circumstances of the person so demanded, and whether 
he ought to be surrendered. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-4, enacted by L. 31 AmJur 2d 945 et seq., Extradition § 30 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. et seq. 
Collateral References. Probable cause, necessity that demanding 
Extradition <3=» 34, 39. state show probable cause to arrest fugitive 
35 CJS Extradition § 13. in extradition proceedings, 90 ALR 3d 1085. 
77-30-5. Extradition for prosecution before conclusion of trial or 
term in other state — Return of person involuntarily leaving demand-
ing state. When it is desired to have returned to this state a person 
charged in this state with a crime, and such person is imprisoned or is 
held under criminal proceedings then pending against him in another state, 
the governor of this state may agree with the executive authority of such 
other state for the extradition of such person before the conclusion of such 
proceedings or his term of sentence in such other state, upon condition that 
such person be returned to such other state at the expense of this state 
as soon as the prosecution in this state is terminated. 
The governor of this state may also surrender on demand of the execu-
tive authority of any other state any person in this state who is charged 
in the manner provided in section 77-30-23 with having violated the laws 
of the state whose executive authority is making the demand, even though 
such person left the demanding state involuntarily. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-5, enacted by L. 35 CJS Extradition § 9. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Surrender of convict to authorities of other 
jurisdiction as precluding punishment or fur-
Collateral References.
 f ther punishment under original conviction, 
Extradition <£=> 29. 147 ALR 941. 
77-30-6, Extradition for crime committed in another state by per-
son while in this state. The governor of this state may also surrender, 
on demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in 
this state charged in such other state, in the manner provided in section 
77-30-3, with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intention-
ally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making 
the demand, and the provisions of this act not otherwise inconsistent shall 
apply to such cases even though the accused was not in that state at the 
time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-6, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition G=* 29 
35 CJS Extradition § 9 
77-30-7. Governor's warrant of arrest — Recitals, [f the governor 
decides that the demand should be complied with he shall sign a warrant 
of arrest, which shall be sealed with the state seal, directed to any peace 
officer or other person whom he may think fit to entrust with the execution 
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thereof. The warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the 
validity of its issuance. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-7, enacted by L. 31 AmJur 2d 966-969, Extradition §§ 60-63. 
Sufficiency of recitals in rendition warrant 
as regards copy of indictment or affidavit, 89 
ALR 595. 
Sufficiency of statements in demand papers 
in extradition proceedings as allegation or 
proof of presence of accused in demanding 
state at time of commission of alleged crime 
or that accused is a fugitive, 135 ALR 973. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Cross-References. 
Warrant of arrest, 77-35-6. 
Collateral References. 
Extradition <§=> 36. 
35 CJS Extradition § 16. 
77-30-8. Execution of warrant of arrest. Such warrant shall autho-
rize the peace officer or other person to whom directed to arrest the 
accused at any time and any place where he may be found within the state 
and to command the aid of all peace officers or other persons in the execu-
tion of the warrant, and to deliver the accused, subject to the provisions 
of this act to the duly authorized agent of the demanding state. 
History: C. 1953, 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-30-8, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
Extradition <&* 36. 
35 CJS Extradition § 16. 
77-30-9. Authority of officers under warrant of arrest. Every such 
peace officer or other person empowered to make the arrest shall have the 
same authority in arresting the accused, to command assistance therein, 
as peace officers have by law in the execution of any criminal process 
directed to them, with like penalties against those who refuse their assist-
ance. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-9, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Collateral References. 
Extradition C=> 37. 
35 CJS Extradition § 12. 
77-30-10. Time to apply for habeas corpus allowed. No person 
arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the 
executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him 
unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record 
in this state who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender 
and of the crime with which he is charged and that he has the right to 
demand and procure legal counsel and if the prisoner or his counsel shall 
state that he or they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge 
of such court of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within 
which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When such writ is applied for, 
notice thereof and the time and place of hearing thereon shall be given 
to the prosecuting officer of the county in which the arrest is made and 
in which the accused is in custody, and to the said agent of the demanding 
state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-10, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Cross-References. 
Courts of record enumerated, 78-1-2. 
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Habeas corpus, Const. Art. I, § 5; Art. VIII, 
§§ 4, 7; 78-2-2, 78-3-4; Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 65B(f). 
Right to counsel, Const. Art. I, § 12; 77-1-6, 
77-35-7. 
Collateral References. 
Extradition <&=> 39. 
35 CJS Extradition § 17. 
31 AmJur 2d 970-975, Extradition §§ 64-67. 
Determination, in extradition proceedings, 
or on habeas corpus in such proceedings, 
whether a crime is charged, 40 ALR 2d 1151. 
Discharge on habeas corpus of one held in 
extradition proceedings as precluding subse-
quent extradition proceedings, 33 ALR 3d 
1443. 
Right of one arrested on extradition war-
rant to delay to enable him to present evi-
dence that he is not subject to extradition, 11 
ALR 1410. 
Right to prove absence from demanding 
state or alibi on habeas corpus in extradition 
proceedings, 61 ALR 715. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Appealable order. 
An order denying motion for discovery in 
proceeding by defendant on extraordinary 
writ akin to habeas corpus to stay execution 
was not a final appealable order. Aldridge v. 
Beckstead (1964) 16 U 2d 136, 396 P 2d 870. 
Burden of proof. 
In extradition proceedings a prima facie 
case was made by the governor's rendition 
warrant and by showing that prisoner had 
the same name as that of the wanted man, 
and the burden was then upon the prisoner 
to offer convincing proof that he was not the 
person demanded. Mora v. Larson (1975) 540 
P 2d 520. 
Person resisting extradition has the bur-
den to prove that he is not the person named 
in the rendition warrant, or that the infor-
mation does not state a crime under the law 
of the demanding state, or that he was not in 
the demanding state when the alleged crime 
was committed. Phillips v. Vance (1979) 594 
P 2d 885. 
Operation and effect. 
The proper process for testing the legal 
sufficiency and validity of an arrest and 
detention in extradition proceedings was the 
habeas corpus proceeding and in such pro-
ceeding the plaintiff should have been 
allowed to test the validity of the extradition 
proceeding and challenge whether the statu-
tory requirements have been met Little v 
Beckstead (1961) 11 U 2d 270, 358 P 2d 93. 
Petitioner was entitled to release in habeas 
corpus proceedings prior to execution of 
extradition since the state of Utah did not 
produce any means of identifying him except 
his first and last name, and it was alleged 
that there were at least four other persons in 
Salt Lake area bearing the same first and 
last names. Madsen v. Larsen (1974) 527 P 2d 
227. 
77-30-11. Penalty for disobedience of preceding section. Any officer 
who shall deliver to the agent for extradition of the demanding state a 
person in his custody under the governor's warrant, in willful disobedience 
to the last preceding section, [77-30-10] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
and on conviction shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned in 
the county jail not more than six months, or both. 
Collateral References. 
Extradition <&* 39. ' 
35 CJS Extradition § 17. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-11, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-30-12. Officers entitled to use local jails. The officer or persons 
executing the governor's warrant of arrest or the agent of the demanding 
state to whom the prisoner may have been delivered may, when necessary, 
confine the prisoner in the jail of any county or city through which he may 
pass and the keeper of such jail must receive and safely keep the prisoner 
until the officer or person having charge of him is ready to proceed on his 
route, such officer or person being chargeable with the expense of keeping. 
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The officer or agent of a demanding state to whom a prisoner may have 
been delivered following extradition proceedings in another state, or to 
whom a prisoner may have been delivered after waiving extradition in such 
other state, and who is passing through this state with such a prisoner 
for the purpose of immediately returning such prisoner to the demanding 
state may, when necessary, confine the prisoner in the jail of any county 
or city through which he may pass, and the keeper of such jail must receive 
and safely keep the prisoner until the officer or agent having charge of 
him is ready to proceed on his route, such officer or agent being chargeable 
with the expense of.keeping; provided, such officer or agent shall produce 
and show to the keeper of such jail satisfactory written evidence of the 
fact that he is actually transporting such prisoner to the demanding state 
after a requisition by the executive authority of such demanding state. 
Such prisoner shall not be entitled to demand a new requisition while in 
this state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-12, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition <S=> 37. 
35 CJS Extradition § 12. 
77-30-13. Fugitives from justice — Warrant of arrest. Whenever any 
person within this state shall be charged on the oath of any credible person 
before any judge or magistrate of this state with the commission of any 
crime in any other state, and, except in cases arising under section 77-30-6 
that he has fled from justice, or with having been convicted of a crime 
in that state and having escaped from confinement, or having broken the 
terms of his bail, probation or parole, or whenever complaint shall have 
been made before any judge or magistrate in this state setting forth on 
the affidavit of any credible person in another state that a crime has been 
committed in such other state and that the accused has been charged in 
such state with the commission of the crime, and except in cases arising 
under section 77-30-6, has fled from justice, or with having been convicted 
of a crime in that state and having escaped from confinement, or having 
broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole, and is believed to be in 
this state, the judge or magistrate shall issue a warrant directed to any 
peace officer commanding him to apprehend the person named therein, 
wherever he may be found in this state, and to bring him before the same 
or any judge, magistrate or court who or which may be available in or 
convenient of access to the place where the arrest may be made, to answer 
the charge or complaint and affidavit, and a certified copy of the sworn 
charge or complaint and affidavit upon which the warrant is issued shall 
be attached to the warrant. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-13, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
Collateral References. 
Extradition <£=> 30. 
35 CJS Extradition § 10. 
31 AmJur 2d 931-933, Extradition §§ 14, 15. 
One removed from demanding state or 
county as a fugitive from justice within con-
templation of extradition laws, 85 ALR 118. 
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77-30-14. Arrest without warranto The arrest of a person may be law-
fully made also by any peace officer or a private person without a warrant 
upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts 
of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, but when so arrested the accused must be taken before 
a judge or magistrate with all practicable speed and complaint must be 
made against him under oath setting forth the ground for the arrest as 
in the preceding section, [77-30-13] and thereafter his answer shall be 
heard as if he had been arrested on a warrant. 
History: C 1953, 77-30-14, enacted by L. 
1980, ch 15, § 2. 
77-30-15e Commitment pending arrest under warrant of governor. 
If from the examination before the judge or magistrate it appears that 
the person held is the person charged with having committed the crime 
alleged, and, except in cases arising under section 77-30-6 that he has fled 
from justice, the judge or magistrate must, by a warrant reciting the accu-
sation, commit him to the county jail for such a time not exceeding thirty 
days and specified in the warrant as will enable the arrest of the accused 
to be made under a warrant of the governor on a requisition of the execu-
tive authority of the state having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the 
accused gives bail as provided in the next section or until he shall be 
legally discharged. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-15, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition O 39. 
35 CJS Extradition § 17. 
77-30-16. Bail, except in capital cases. Unless the offense with which 
the prisoner is charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or 
life imprisonment under the laws of the state in which it was committed 
a judge or magistrate in this state may admit the person arrested to bail 
by bond, with sufficient sureties, and in such sum as he deems proper, con-
ditioned for his appearance before him at a time specified in such bond, 
and for his surrender, to be arrested upon the warrant of the governor 
of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-16, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition O 37. 
r,,AeD v ^ ^ ^ 35 CJS Extradition § 19. 
Cross-References. Extradition § 27. 
Bail generally, Const Art I, §§ 8, 9; 77-20-1 
et seq. 
77-30-17. Procedure when no arrest made under warrant of gover-
nor. If the accused is not arrested under warrant of the governor by the 
expiration of the time specified in the warrant or bond, a judge or magis-
trate may discharge him or may recommit him for a further period not 
to exceed sixty days, or a judge or magistrate may again take bail for his 
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appearance and surrender, as provided in section 77-30-16, but within a 
period not to exceed sixty days after the date of such new bond. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-17, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-30-18. Forfeiture of bail. If the prisoner is admitted to bail and 
fails to appear and surrender himself according to the conditions of his 
bond the judge or magistrate by proper order shall declare the bond for-
feited and order his immediate arrest without warrant if he be within this 
state. Recovery may be had on such bond in the name of the state as in 
the case of other bonds given by the accused in criminal proceedings within 
this state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-18, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition <3=> 37 
35 CJS Extradition § 19. 
77-30-19. Procedure if prosecution pending in this state. If a crimi-
nal prosecution has been instituted against such person under the laws of 
this state and is still pending the governor, in his discretion, may either 
surrender him on demand of the executive authority of another state or 
hold him until he has been tried and discharged or convicted and punished 
in this state. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-19, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition <3=> 31. 
35 CJS Extradition § 11. 
31 AmJur 2d 935, Extradition § 18. 
77-30-20. Governor not to inquire into guilt or innocence. The guilt 
or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which he is charged in 
another state may not be inquired into by the governor or in any proceed-
ing after the demand for extradition accompanied by a charge of crime 
in legal form as above provided shall have been presented to the governor, 
except as it may be involved in identifying the person held as the person 
charged with the crime. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-20, enacted by L. Determination in extradition proceedings, 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. or on habeas corpus in such proceedings, 
Collateral References. whether a crime is charged, 40 ALR 2d 1151. 
Extradition <§=> 35 Necessity and sufficiency of identification 
35 CJS Extradition § 15. °f accused as the person charged, to warrant 
31 AmJur 2d 956, 957, Extradition §§ 47, 48. extradition, 93 ALR 2d 912. 
77-30-21. Governor's warrant of arrest recalled or another issued. 
The governor may recall his warrant of arrest or may issue another war-
rant whenever he deems proper. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-21, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition <3=> 36. 
35 CJS Extradition § 16. 
31 AmJur 2d 969, Extradition § 63. 
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77-30-22. Fugitives from this state — Issuance of governor's war-
rant. Whenever the governor of this state shall demand a person charged 
with a crime or with escaping from confinement or breaking the terms of 
his bail, probation, or parole in this state from the executive authority of 
any other state or from the chief justice or an associate justice of the supe-
rior court of the District of Columbia authorized to receive such demand 
under the laws of the United States, he shall issue a warrant under the 
seal of this state to some agent, commanding him to receive the person 
so charged if delivered to him and convey him to the proper officer of the 
county in this state in which the offense was committed. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-22, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition <£=> 23-26, 36. 
35 CJS Extradition §§ 4-6,16. 
77-30-23. Fugitives from this state — Applications for requisition 
for return. (1) When the return to this state of a person charged with 
a crime in this state is required, the prosecuting attorney shall present 
to the governor his written application for a requisition for the return of 
the person charged, in which application shall be stated the name of the 
person so charged, the crime charged against him, the approximate time, 
place and circumstances of its commission, the state in which he is believed 
to be, including the location of the accused therein at the time the applica-
tion is made, and certifying that in the opinion of the said prosecuting 
attorney the ends of justice require the arrest and return of the accused 
to this state for trial and that the proceeding is not instituted to enforce 
a private claim. 
(2) When the return to this state is required of a person who has been 
convicted of a crime in this state and has escaped from confinement or 
broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole the prosecuting attorney 
of the county in which the offense was committed, the parole board, or 
the warden of the institution or sheriff of the county from which escape 
was made shall present to the governor a written application for a requisi-
tion for the return of such person, in which application shall be stated the 
name of the person, the crime of which he was convicted, the circumstances 
of his escape from confinement, or of the breach of the terms of his bail, 
probation or parole, the state in which he is believed to be, including the 
location of the person therein at the time application is made. 
(3) The application shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in 
duplicate, and shall be accompanied by two certified copies of the indict-
ment returned, or information and affidavit filed, or of the complaint made 
to the judge or magistrate stating the offense with which the accused is 
charged, or of the judgment or conviction, or of the sentence. The prosecut-
ing officer, parole board, warden, or sheriff may also attach such further 
affidavits and other documents in duplicate as he shall deem proper to be 
submitted with such application. One copy of the application with the 
action of the governor indicated by endorsement thereon and one of the 
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certified copies of the indictment, complaint, information and affidavits or 
of the judgment of conviction or of the sentence shall be filed in the office 
of the secretary of state to remain of record in that office. The other copies 
of all papers shall be forwarded with the governor's requisition. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-23, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition <S=> 34. 
35 CJS Extradition § 13. 
31 AmJur 2d 945-947, Extradition §§ 31-33. 
77-30-24. Payment of expenses. When the punishment of the crime 
shall be the confinement of the criminal in the prison, the expenses shall 
be paid out of the state treasury on the certificate of the governor and 
warrant of the auditor, and in all other cases they shall be paid out of 
the county treasury in the county wherein the crime is alleged to have been 
committed. The expenses shall be the fees paid to the officers of the state 
on whose governor the requisition is made, not exceeding ten cents a mile 
for all necessary travel in returning such prisoner. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-24, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Extradition <3^  40. 
35 CJS Extradition § 23. 
31 AmJur 2d 940, Extradition § 24. 
77-30-25. Person brought into state on extradition exempt from 
civil process — Waiver of extradition proceedings — Non-waiver by 
this state. (1) A person brought into this state by or after waiver of extra-
dition based on a criminal charge shall not be subject to service of personal 
process in civil actions arising out of the same facts as the criminal pro-
ceedings to answer which he is being or has been returned until he has 
been convicted in the criminal proceedings, or, if acquitted, until he has 
had reasonable opportunity to return to the state from which he was extra-
dited. 
(2) Any person arrested in this state charged with having committed 
any crime in another state or alleged to have escaped from confinement 
or broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole may waive the issuance 
and service of the warrant provided for in sections 77-30-7 and 77-30-8, and 
all other procedure incidental to extradition proceedings, by executing or 
subscribing in the presence of a judge of any court of record within this 
state a writing which states that he consents to return to the demanding 
state; provided, before such waiver shall be executed or subscribed by such 
person it shall be the duty of such judge to inform such person of his rights 
to the issuance and service of a warrant of extradition and to obtain a 
writ of habeas corpus as provided for in section 77-30-10. 
If and when such consent has been duly executed it shall forthwith be 
forwarded to the office of the governor of this state and filed therein. The 
judge shall direct the officer having such person in custody to deliver forth-
with such person to the duly accredited agent or agents of the demanding 
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state and shall deliver or cause to be delivered to such agent or agents 
a copy of such consent; provided, nothing in this section shall be deemed 
to limit the rights of the accused person to return voluntarily and without 
formality to the demanding state, or shall this waiver procedure be deemed 
to be an exclusive procedure or to limit the powers, rights, or duties of 
the officers of the demanding state or of this state. 
(3) Nothing in this act shall be deemed to constitute a waiver by this 
state of its right, power or privilege to try such demanded person for a 
crime committed within this state, or of its right, power or privilege to 
regain custody of such person by extradition proceedings or otherwise for 
the purpose of trial, sentence or punishment for any crime committed 
within this state, or shall any proceedings had under this act which result 
in or fail to result in extradition be deemed a waiver by this state of any 
of its rights, privileges or jurisdiction in any way whatsoever. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-25, enacted by L. 35 CJS Extradition § 21. 
1980, ch 15, § 2. 31 ArnJur 2d 980, 981, Extradition §§ 74, 75 
Collateral References. Immunity of extradited person from ser-
Extradition <&* 41 vice of process, 20 ALR 2d 172. 
77-30-26. Prosecution not limited to crime specified in requisition. 
After a person has been brought back to this state by or after waiver of 
extradition proceedings he may be tried in this state for other crimes 
which he may be charged with having committed here as well as that spec-
ified in the requisition for his extradition. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-26, enacted by L. Right to try one for an offense other than 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. that named in extradition proceedings, 21 
Collateral References. A L R l m-
Extradition <£= 41 Surrender of fugitive as waiver by asylum 
35 CJS Extradition §21. state of right to prosecute him for offense 
31 ArnJur 2d 978, Extradition § 72. previously committed, 93 ALR 931 
77-30-27. Uniformity of interpretation. The provisions of this act 
shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purposes 
to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-27, enacted by L. 
1980, ch 15, § 2. 
77-30-28. Citation — Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. This act 
may be cited as the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. 
History: C 1953, 77-30-28, enacted by L. 
1980, ch 15, § 2. 
CHAPTER 31 




77-30-2. Duty of governor to deliver person charged, etc. 
Juvenile. being extradited to Wyoming. Burnham v. 
Utah juvenile charged as an adult in Wyo* Hayward (1983) 663 P 2d 65. 
ming with two counts of first degree sexual 
assault and battery with felonious intent, ^aw Reviews. 
aggravated robbery and burglary was not Interstate Extradition: Should the Asylum 
entitled to a hearing in Utah's juvenile court State Governor Have Unbridled Discretion?, 
for certification to be tried as an adult before 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 376. 
77-30-3. Form of demand — What documents presented must show. 
Affidavit based on hearsay. 
Extradition warrant can be issued on the 
basis of an affidavit based on hearsay. 
Langley v. Hayward (1982) 656 P 2d 1020. 
77-30-10. Time to apply for habeas corpus allowed. 
Burden of proof. name as that appearing on the papers; where 
Habeas corpus petitioner who denies that ^ takte h a s made a prima facie case, the 
he is a furtive from iustice has the burden h a b e a s c o r p u s P e t l t l o n e r h a s t h e b u r d e n of ne is a lugime trom justice nas trie burden • forward with affirmative evidence that 
of proving that fact by clear and convincing £e £ n o t t h e Qn n a m e d i n t h e g 
evidence. Langley v. Hayward (1982) 656 P 2d
 a n d w h e r e h e d o e s so> t h e g t a t e ig r e q u i r e c i 
1"*0. ^0 corroborate the petitioner's identity with 
State has the burden of proving that the the person named in the extradition papers, 
person arrested is the person named in the
 a nd wnere the state so corroborates, the 
extradition papers, and a prima facie case is court must weigh the evidence and make a 
established where the state shows that the finding on the issue of identity. Langley v. 
arrested person has or is known by the same Hayward (1982) 656 P 2d 1020. 
77-30-23. Fugitives from this state — Applications for requisition for 
return. (1) When the return to this state of a person charged with a crime in this 
state is required, the prosecuting attorney shall present to the governor his written 
application for a requisition for the return of the person charged, in which applica-
tion shall be stated the name of the person so charged, the crime charged against 
him, the approximate time, place, and circumstances of its commission, the state 
in which he is believed to be, including the location of the accused therein at the 
time the application is made, and certifying that in the opinion of the said prose-
cuting attorney the ends of justice require the arrest and return of the accused 
to this state for trial and that the proceeding is not instituted to enforce a private 
claim. 
(2) When the return to this state is required of a person wrho has been convicted 
of a crime in this state and has escaped from confinement or broken the terms 
of his bail, probation, or parole, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which 
the offense was committed, the parole board, or the warden of the institution or 
sheriff of the county from which escape was made shall present to the governor 
a written application for a requisition for the return of such person, in which appli-
cation shall be stated the name of the person, the crime of which he was convicted, 
the circumstances of his escape from confinement, or of the breach of the terms 
of his bail, probation, or parole, the state in which he is believed to be, including 
the location of the person therein at the time application is made. 
(3) The application shall be verified by affidavit, shall be executed in duplicate, 
and shall be accompanied by two certified copies of the indictment returned, or 
information and affidavit filed, or of the complaint made to the judge or magistrate 
stating the offense with which the accused is charged, or of the judgment or convic-
tion, or of the sentence. 
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The prosecuting officer, parole board, warden, or sheriff may also attach such 
further affidavits and other documents in duplicate as he shall deem proper to be 
submitted with such application. One copy of the application with the action of 
the governor indicated by endorsement thereon and one of the certified copies of 
the indictment, complaint, information, and affidavits or of the judgment of convic-
tion or of the sentence shall be filed in the office of the governor to remain of 
record in that office. The other copies of all papers shall be forwarded with the 
governor's requisition. 
History: C. 1953, 77-30-23, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; L. 1984, ch. 67, § 64. The 1984 amendment substituted "gover-
nor" for "secretary of state" in the second 
sentence of the second paragraph of subsec. 
(3). 
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Section 
77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for defense of indigent defendants. 
77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on request of defendant or order of court. 
77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for defense of indigent 
defendants. The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, 
city and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts 
and various administrative bodies of the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial proba-
bility of the deprivation of his liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) Provide the invest igatory and other facilities necessary for a complete 
defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of other 
remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be 
in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or 
discretionary writ proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 77-32-1, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; L. 1981, ch. 67, § 1; 1983, ch. The 1983 amendment substituted "substan-
52, § 1. tial probability" for "possibility" in subsec. 
(1); and deleted "or other serious criminal 
sanction" at the end of subsec. (1). 
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